Focal points and payoff information in tacit bargaining by Isoni, Andrea et al.
Focal Points and Payoff Information in Tacit Bargaining 
 
Andrea Isoni* 
Anders Poulsen† 
Robert Sugden‡ 
Kei Tsutsui§ 
 
February 2017 
                                                          
* Corresponding author.  Behavioural Science Group, Warwick Business School, Coventry (UK); and 
University of Cagliari, Italy.  Email: a.isoni@warwick.ac.uk. 
† School of Economics and Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science, University of East Anglia, 
Norwich (UK).  Email: a.poulsen@uea.ac.uk. 
‡ Corresponding author. School of Economics and Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science, 
University of East Anglia, Norwich (UK).  Email: r.sugden@uea.ac.uk. 
§ Department of Economics, University of Bath, Bath (UK).  Email: k.tsutsui@bath.ac.uk. 
This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s 
Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme, grant agreement No. 670103. 
1 
 
Focal Points and Payoff Information in Tacit Bargaining 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Schelling proposed that payoff-irrelevant cues can affect the outcome of tacit bargaining 
games by creating focal points.  Tests of this hypothesis have found that conflicts of interest 
between players inhibit focal-point reasoning.  We investigate experimentally whether this 
effect is reduced if players have imperfect information about each other’s payoffs.  When 
players know only their own payoffs, they fail to ignore this information even though it 
cannot assist coordination; the effects of payoff-irrelevant cues on coordination success are 
small.  When no exact information about payoffs is provided, payoff-irrelevant cues are more 
helpful, but not as much as when conflict is absent.  
Keywords: focal points, tacit bargaining, coordination, conflict of interest, payoff 
information, payoff-irrelevant cue. 
JEL classification: C72, C78, C91. 
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In his famous book The Strategy of Conflict, Schelling (1960) develops a theory of focal-
point reasoning in games with multiple Nash equilibria.  This form of reasoning is 
fundamentally different from the best-response reasoning that is standard in game-theoretic 
analysis.  The essential idea is that players concert their mutual expectations on one 
equilibrium – the focal point – by appealing to their shared knowledge about salient 
properties of the game.  In some cases, the focal point is salient because it payoff-dominates 
other equilibria, but salience often derives from payoff-irrelevant features of the way 
strategies are labelled.   
 It is now empirically well established that real players successfully coordinate on 
payoff-dominant equilibria in coordination games in which there are no conflicts of interest 
(e.g. Bacharach, 2006; Bardsley et al., 2010) and that label-salient focal points are very 
effective in Pure Coordination games, in which all equilibria have the same payoffs for all 
players (e.g. Schelling, 1960; Mehta et al., 1994a, 1994b; Bacharach and Bernasconi, 1997; 
Crawford et al., 2008; Bardsley et al., 2010; Parravano and Poulsen, 2015).  Significantly, 
however, these cases of successful coordination occur in games in which the players have a 
shared ranking of the equilibria.  Schelling argues that rational players would use the same 
kind of reasoning in what he calls situations of tacit bargaining, that is, games in which two 
players have a common interest in coordinating their strategies, but their interests conflict 
over how coordination should be achieved, and communication is not possible.  He uses the 
term ‘tacit bargaining’ to signify that games of this kind can be useful reduced-form models 
of real-world bargaining situations, including situations in which communication is possible.1  
 The simplest examples of tacit bargaining games have the 22 Battle of the Sexes 
structure.  Like Pure Coordination games, these games are symmetrical with respect to 
players and strategies, and so classical game theory cannot distinguish between the pure-
strategy equilibria (e.g. Harsanyi and Selten, 1988); the difference is that the players have 
conflicting rankings of those equilibria.2  Just as in Pure Coordination games, the players may 
                                                          
1 Schelling (1960: 267–272) argues that if ‘explicit’ bargaining takes place over a finite period of time and if the 
procedure by which players communicate is ‘perfectly move-symmetrical’, there must be a final period in which 
a tacit bargaining subgame is played.  If the solution to this subgame is common knowledge, no player will 
accept a lower payoff in earlier rounds of the game. 
2 The distinction between Pure Coordination and Battle of the Sexes games is often described as that between 
games with symmetric and asymmetric payoffs (e.g. Crawford et al., 2008).  Because both types of game are 
invariant with respect to renaming players and strategies, we prefer to distinguish between the absence and 
presence of conflict of interest. 
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have common knowledge of salient labelling properties that would allow them to concert 
their expectations on a focal point.  Schelling conjectures that, when individual interests are 
secondary to the primary need for coordination – that is, when the reward from coordinating 
is sufficiently large relative to the loss in payoff from not coordinating on one’s preferred 
equilibrium – rational players can ‘discipline’ themselves to accept a lesser share if a useful 
cue points that way (p. 286).  
It has been found that, consistently with Schelling’s conjecture, certain kinds of 
labelling asymmetries are used as cues for achieving coordination in tacit bargaining games.  
Such asymmetries include the gender of the players (Holm, 2000) and which player is 
described as the first mover in a Battle of the Sexes game that is strategically equivalent to a 
simultaneous move game (Cooper et al., 1993; Güth et al., 1998).  However, when 
coordination games are framed as matching games – that is, framed so that coordination 
requires both players to choose the same strategy – there is substantially less coordination on 
salient equilibria if there is conflict of interest than if there is not (Crawford et al., 2008; 
Faillo et al., 2017).  In the most extreme cases, such as the 22 games in Crawford et al.’s 
experiment, coordination payoff differences of as little as two per cent induce rates of 
coordination lower than would have resulted from random behaviour.  In interpreting these 
findings, Crawford et al. propose a version of level-k theory (Stahl and Wilson, 1995; Nagel, 
1995) in which payoff-irrelevant cues serve only as tie-breakers, with the implication that 
such cues are used only in the very special case of Pure Coordination games.3 
 This implication is clearly too extreme, even for matching games.  In 33 matching 
games with conflicts of interest, Faillo et al. find evidence indicative of level-k reasoning but 
incompatible with focal-point reasoning, and evidence indicative of the opposite.  The 
relevant games can be described by the three pairs of payoffs on the main diagonal of the 
payoff matrix, all other payoffs being zero and no label being salient.  For example, in the 
‘G6’ game {(10, 9), (9, 10), (9, 8)} the third strategy is unique by virtue of its payoffs, but 
only 5.6 per cent chose that strategy, consistently with level-k reasoning but contrary to focal-
point reasoning.  In the ‘G7’ game {(10, 9), (9, 10), (9, 9)}, 69 per cent chose the third 
                                                          
3 Although Crawford et al.’s level-k model can account both for coordination success in Pure Coordination 
games and coordination failure in Battle of the Sexes, direct investigation of reasoning in those games by van 
Elten and Penczynski (2018) reveals marked differences between the two cases, with level-k reasoning more 
common in Battle of the Sexes games and Schelling-style ‘team reasoning’ in Pure Coordination games.    
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strategy, consistently with focal-point reasoning, when the level-k model implies that no 
player (except at ‘level 0’) should make that choice. 
Isoni et al. (2013) investigate coordination games that are framed to incorporate 
aspects of real-world bargaining – particularly, that players make claims on specific valuable 
objects (with the implication that coordination requires players to choose different objects), 
that salient labelling cues take the form of relations between players and objects, and that 
some of the available surplus can be left unclaimed.  In these games, there is significantly 
more coordination if such cues are present than if they are not.  Nevertheless, for given cues, 
the presence of conflict of interest reduces coordination.  This evidence suggests that, 
contrary to Schelling’s hypothesis, given players are less likely to use focal-point reasoning, 
or use it less effectively, when they have conflicting rankings of coordination equilibria.  
Since such conflict is likely to occur in most real-world situations of coordination and 
bargaining, it is important to establish under what conditions focal-point reasoning is likely to 
be adopted.   
The research reported in the present paper was prompted by the thought that most 
experiments fail to capture a key aspect of real-world situations of coordination and 
bargaining.  Contrary to what happens in the lab, real-world players may not know exactly 
how much it is worth to them and their co-players to coordinate on a certain label or to reach 
a certain agreement.  They may have better knowledge of their own utilities than their co-
players’, or sometimes even be unsure about their own utilities.  By making payoff 
differences unambiguous and by establishing common knowledge about them, experimental 
games may overemphasise a kind of information that may be impossible for real-world 
agents to acquire with a comparable degree of precision.  If the presence of conflict inhibits 
focal-point reasoning, the emphasis that lab experiments put on it may lead to wrong 
conclusions about its relevance for real-world settings.  In order to conduct a more realistic 
test of how conflicts of interest affect focal-point reasoning, it is important to consider 
situations in which payoffs are less than perfectly known.  This is the main objective of our 
paper. 
To address our research question, we need to be able to manipulate payoff 
information in a setup in which there are focal points that reliably affect behaviour, and in 
which the inhibiting effect of conflicts of interests on focal-point reasoning has been 
observed and can be easily replicated.  To this end, we adapt the bargaining table design used 
by Isoni et al. (2013).  Our adaptation allows us to represent three simple types of 22 game 
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with and without payoff-irrelevant labelling cues, all with two pure-strategy Nash equilibria: 
Pure Coordination games, Hi-Lo games (i.e., coordination games in which one pure-strategy 
equilibrium strictly Pareto dominates the other), and Battle of the Sexes games.  Conflict of 
interest is present in the latter game, but not in the former two.  Crucially, in the modified 
setup it is possible to vary the information that players have about the payoffs of the game, 
and hence whether conflicts of interest are common knowledge.  
We study games that belong to one of three information conditions: a Full 
Information condition, in which both players know all payoffs; an Own Information 
condition, in which each player exactly knows her payoffs, but not the other player’s; and a 
No Information condition, in which neither player knows the exact values of the payoffs.  In 
all cases, the information condition is common knowledge.  In the Full Information condition, 
it is common knowledge which of the three types of game is being played.  In the other two 
conditions, neither player knows whether they are playing a Battle of the Sexes or a Hi-Lo 
game, hence whether there is conflict or not.4 
Our initial conjecture was that focal-point reasoning would be more likely to be used, 
and hence labelling cues would be more effective, when conflicts of interest were less 
obvious.  To formalise this conjecture, we develop a model in which each player is capable of 
using both focal-point and level-k reasoning (but not both at the same time); which of the two 
modes is more likely to be used in any given game is influenced by the presence or absence 
of conflicts of interest.  The model organises the evidence, existing prior to our experiment 
and on which our conjecture was based, about the effect of labelling cues in the Full 
Information versions of Pure Coordination, Hi-Lo and Battle of the Sexes games.  It makes 
new predictions for the Own and No Information games.  In the Own Information condition, 
it predicts better coordination success than in Battle of the Sexes but worse than in Pure 
Coordination games.  In the No Information condition, it predicts the same level of 
coordination success as in Pure Coordination games.   
                                                          
4 Our focus on one-shot tacit coordination problems sets our contribution apart from the early work by Roth and 
Malouf (1979), Roth et al. (1981), and Roth and Murnighan (1982), who explored the effect of varying players’ 
degree of payoff information in two-player explicit bargaining games with offers and counteroffers which 
resulted in lotteries for the two players, and found a broad tendency for agreements to be biased towards 
outcomes that equated the two players’ expected experimental earnings.  Our games also differ significantly 
from the matching games studied by Agranov and Schotter (2012), in which players learn to coordinate on the 
label-salient equilibrium in games with ‘coarse’ payoff information when these are played repeatedly with 
stranger matching and round-by-round feedback on the actual payoff configuration and realised outcomes.  In 
line with Schelling’s hypothesis, we study systematic coordination that occurs prior to any learning. 
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Surprisingly, our data provide no support for the hypothesis that de-emphasising 
conflicts of interest facilitates focal-point reasoning in one-shot tacit bargaining games.  In 
the Own Information condition, players seem to find it hard to disregard unhelpful private 
information, and achieve levels of coordination that are, if anything, lower than in Battle of 
the Sexes games.  Even in the No Information condition, coordination success falls short of 
the levels achieved in Pure Coordination games played under Full Information.  Our results 
provide further evidence that the tension between focal-point and individual best-response 
reasoning such as level-k thinking is not easily resolved in the presence of conflicts of 
interest. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.  Section 1 describes our 
adaptation of the bargaining table design.  Our model is developed in Section 2.  In Section 3, 
that model is used to derive hypotheses for our experiment.  Section 4 gives details of how 
the experiment was implemented.  We present our results in Sections 5, 6 and 7.  Section 8 
discusses the implications of these results and concludes. 
  
1. Experimental design 
The left-hand side of Figure 1 shows one of the ‘scenarios’ faced by participants in our 
experiment.  The scenario on the right-hand side is the same game as viewed by the matched 
player. 
 [Insert Figure 1 here] 
Taken together, the two scenarios constitute a tacit bargaining game represented by a 99 
grid.  The two squares represent the two players’ respective bases.  Each player knows which 
base is theirs because it is shown in red at the bottom of the table they see and is labelled 
‘You’.  For each player, it is straightforward to work out how the game looks from the 
‘Other’ player’s perspective.   
There are two discs on the table, each split into two halves.  There is a value in each 
half.  The value on the half facing each base represents the value of the disc (in UK pounds) 
to the player assigned to that base.  For the game in the example, each of the two discs is 
closer to one of the two bases.  For each player, the close disc is worth £10 to them and £11 
to the other player, while the far disc is worth £11 to them and £10 to the other player.  
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The game was described to participants as an ‘opportunity to agree on a division of 
the discs’.  Each player separately recorded which disc(s) she ‘proposed to take’ or ‘claimed’.  
If no disc was claimed by both players, the players were said to have ‘agreed’; each player 
earned the total value to her of the discs she had claimed.  If any disc was claimed by both 
players, there was ‘no agreement’, and neither player earned anything from the game.5  
For the game in Figure 1, each player’s strategies can be described as either: claim 
none of the discs, claim the close disc only, claim the far disc only, or claim both discs.  
Claiming none of the discs is a weakly dominated strategy.  If this strategy is eliminated, 
claiming both discs is weakly dominated.  After iterated elimination of weakly dominated 
strategies, we are left with a 22 game with the payoffs shown below:6  
  Other 
  Close Far 
You 
Close 10, 10 0, 0 
Far 0, 0 11, 11 
The distinction between ‘Close’ and ‘Far’ represents a distinction between the two equilibria 
that is common knowledge between the players and that has the potential to be used as a 
means of coordination.  The matrix describes a Hi-Lo game with two Pareto-ranked Nash 
equilibria in pure strategies ([Close, Close] and [Far, Far]) and a mixed-strategy Nash 
equilibrium (each player plays Close with probability 11/21).  Given that players are 
described as ‘You’ and ‘Other’, the only information that would allow a player to distinguish 
between the two pure strategies is the difference between getting 10 or 11 and the relative 
salience of Close and Far. 
If our design is to identify the positive and negative effects of labelling cues on 
coordination, we need a control condition in which such cues are either absent or ineffective.  
It might seem that the obvious way to implement control would be to remove the two player’s 
bases and show exactly the same display to both players.  While this may work in a game like 
                                                          
5 Although all our games have just two discs, we allowed players to also claim none or both discs.  Isoni et al. 
(2013) looked at the effect of forcing players to claim exactly one disc and found that, other things being equal, 
that somewhat reduced the salience of closeness cues.  Because we need salient cues to address our research 
question, we used the version of the games in which none or both discs could be claimed.  This has also the 
advantage of preserving the bargaining feel of the game. 
6 As a necessary step for experimental implementation, we use the term ‘payoff’ to refer to material payoffs 
(expressed in money units), but treat these as if, for each player considered separately, they were close proxies 
for utilities in the sense of classical game theory.  As in that theory, we make no assumptions about the 
interpersonal comparability of utility. 
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the one in the example, it would be unsatisfactory for Battle of the Sexes and Pure 
Coordination games, which (apart from labelling) are perfectly symmetrical with respect to 
players and strategies.  In such an alternative control version of these games, the only strategy 
descriptions available to the players would share the property that coordination would require 
them to choose different strategies. But without communication, players who identify 
themselves only as ‘me’ and ‘other’ would have no means of achieving such coordination.  
Thus, this control would fundamentally change the nature of the game.7 
For our purposes, the most useful control condition is one in which labelling cues 
remain, but are minimally salient.  Following the precedent of previous bargaining table 
experiments (Isoni et al., 2013, 2014), we match games with closeness cues with ‘spatially 
neutral’ games.  An example of how such a game would look for two matched players is 
shown in Figure 2.  
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 This is essentially the same as the previous game, except for the positions of the two 
discs, which are now equidistant from the two bases.  From the point of view of each player, 
the strategies can be described as either: claim none of the discs, claim the disc more to the 
left as seen from your base, claim the disc more to the right as seen from your base, or claim 
both discs.  After iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies, this game can be 
presented in normal form as: 
  Other 
  Left Right 
You 
Left 10, 10 0, 0 
Right 0, 0 11, 11 
This payoff matrix is identical to that for the game in Figure 1, except for the labels.  Like 
that game, this has two pure-strategy equilibria ([Left, Left] and [Right, Right]) and a mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium (each player plays Left with probability 11/21).   
In both games considered so far, there are labelling cues that in principle could be 
used as a means of coordination but, intuitively, it seems clear that the rule of choosing the 
disc that is more to the left (or to the right) is likely to be much less conducive to 
                                                          
7 Compare the concept of attainability in Crawford and Haller (1990) and Blume (2000). 
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coordination than the rule of choosing the disc closer to one’s base.  And in fact, there is 
strong evidence that this is the case (e.g., Mehta et al., 1994b; Isoni, et al., 2013, 2014).  Our 
experimental design is premised on the assumption that, when both discs are equidistant from 
the two bases, players who try to use spatial location as a coordination device will distribute 
their choices between the discs with approximately equal probability.  Given this assumption, 
such games can be used as controls.  Our design allows us to check the validity of this 
assumption.  
In order to assess the ability of payoff-irrelevant cues to influence coordination 
success, we will contrast Closeness games in which (as in Figure 1) there is one disc closer to 
each base, and Spatially Neutral games in which (as in Figure 2) both discs are equidistant 
from the two bases.  Our experiment was designed to study the effects of closeness cues in a 
variety of situations, including different degrees of conflict between coordination equilibria 
and information about the value of each disc to each player.  
 In the remainder of this paper, we will use the word scenario to indicate a game as 
seen by an individual player, and the word game to indicate the result of two matching 
scenarios like those in Figures 1 and 2.  In each scenario, the positions of the two discs were 
always common knowledge, and there was a disc value pair {X, Y} with 0 < X ≤ Y, which 
was also common knowledge.  For each player, there was always one disc worth X and one 
disc worth Y.  The particular configuration of which disc was worth X and which was worth Y 
for each player will be called the assignment of disc values.  When X = Y, there is just one 
possible assignment of values to discs, which is necessarily common knowledge.  This 
produces a Pure Coordination game.  When X < Y, there are four possible assignments of disc 
values.  Two of these produce Hi-Lo games, in which the players’ interests are fully aligned; 
the other two produce Battle of the Sexes games, in which the players have conflicting 
rankings of the two equilibria.  In different information conditions, players had different 
degrees of information about this assignment.  When players were not fully informed about 
the actual assignment, each of the four possible assignments had the same prior probability. 
The scenarios used in the experiment can be grouped into four classes, defined in 
terms of disc values and information conditions. 
In Pure Coordination (PC) scenarios, it is common knowledge that X = Y, and hence 
that the players are facing a Pure Coordination game.  These scenarios allow us to verify that, 
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in the absence of conflict of interest, closeness cues are more salient than other cues.  An 
example of a Pure Coordination scenario is shown in Figure 3a.8 
  In the other three classes of scenarios, it is common knowledge that X < Y.  In Full 
Information (FI) scenarios, the assignment of disc values is common knowledge.  Thus, it is 
common knowledge that the players are facing a Hi-Lo game or a Battle of the Sexes game.  
If the game is Hi-Lo, it is common knowledge if closeness is congruent or incongruent with 
payoffs – i.e., whether or not the payoff dominant equilibrium has a salient label.  If the game 
is Battle of the Sexes and if there is one disc on each player’s side of the table, the ‘You’ 
player can either be favoured by closeness (scenario C5) or unfavoured (scenario C4).  An 
example of an FI scenario is shown in Figure 3b; this is part of a Hi-Lo game.   
In Own Information (OI) scenarios, each player knows the value of each disc to her 
but not their values to the other player; this is common knowledge.  In our displays, the 
‘Other’ player’s disc values are replaced by question marks.  From these displays and from 
the information at their disposal, each player can figure out that her scenario may be part of 
either a Hi-Lo game or a Battle of the Sexes game.  In scenario C6, closeness is bad for the 
‘You’ player (the close disc is worth X), in scenario C7 it is good (the close disc is worth Y).  
An example of an OI scenario is shown in Figure 3c. 
From the viewpoint of classical game theory, these scenarios represent games of 
incomplete information.  After iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies, each of 
these games has three pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria: one in which both players 
always choose the close (respectively, left) disc, one in which both players always choose the 
far (right) disc, and one in which each player always chooses the disc that is worth Y to her.  
The first two of these equilibria result in perfect coordination, while the last results in 
successful coordination only fifty percent of the time.  There are also two mixed-strategy 
equilibria, in one of which the close (respectively, left) disc, and in the other the far 
(respectively, right) disc is claimed with probability 1 when it is worth Y and with probability 
(Y – X)/(X + Y) when it is worth X.9 
                                                          
8 The numbers that appear next to the left and bottom edge of the bargaining tables in Figure 3 are coordinates 
that uniquely identify the positions of the two discs.  These were not shown to participants, but will be used in 
Section 4 to describe the exact ‘layouts’ of discs.  In the experiment, the disc values were preceded by the ‘£’ 
symbol. 
9 These equilibria are derived in the Appendix (intended for online publication). 
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In No Information (NI) scenarios, the assignment is completely unknown to both 
players; this is common knowledge.  In our displays, all disc values are replaced by question 
marks.  From these displays and from the information at their disposal, each player can figure 
out that her scenario may be part of either one of two Hi-Lo games or be one of the two 
scenarios making up a Battle of the Sexes game.  An example of an NI scenario is shown in 
Figure 3d. 
The scenarios used in the experiment can also be classified according to the spatial 
locations of the discs.  In Closeness scenarios, such as those shown in Figures 3a and 3c, one 
disc is closer to the ‘You’ base and the other is closer to the ‘Other’ base.  In Spatially 
Neutral scenarios, such as those shown in Figures 3b and 3d, both discs are equidistant from 
the two bases; necessarily, one disc is more to the left, as viewed by the ‘You’ base.   
To maintain symmetry in our design, every Closeness scenario has a corresponding 
Spatially Neutral scenario, and vice versa.  In each pair of corresponding scenarios, the two 
scenarios belong to the same class (PC, FI, OI or NI) and have the same disc value pair.  
Recall that in a Closeness scenario of class FI or OI, the ‘You’ player knows whether the disc 
that is closer to her base is more or less valuable to her than the disc that is further away.  In a 
corresponding Spatially Neutral scenario, the ‘You’ player knows whether the disc that is 
more to her left is more or less valuable to her than the disc that is more to her right.  We 
adopt the convention that a Closeness scenario in which the more valuable disc is closer to 
the ‘You’ base corresponds with a Spatially Neutral scenario in which the more valuable disc 
is more to the left.  Given our premise that neither left nor right is salient, this convention is 
inconsequential to our analysis.10 
Table 1 presents an overview of the types of scenarios that participants faced in our 
experiment.  In describing scenarios, we use the following notation.  Discs are shown by two 
entries in parentheses, in which the first entry is the value of the disc to the participant 
(‘You’), and the second is the value to the player they are facing (‘Other’).  For example, (X, 
Y) denotes a disc worth X to ‘You’ and Y to ‘Other’; (Y, ?) is a disc worth Y to ‘You’ and 
either X or Y to  ‘Other’; (?, ?) is a disc worth either X or Y both to ‘You’ and  ‘Other’.  The 
two vertical bars | | are used to identify the middle row of the table as seen by the participant.  
In Closeness games, the close disc is shown to the left of | | and the far disc to the right.  In 
Spatially Neutral games, both discs are between the two bars, the first disc indicating the 
                                                          
10 This premise is confirmed (see Section 5). 
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leftmost disc as seen by the participant, the second indicating the rightmost disc.  For 
example, the scenario on the left-hand side of Figure 1 is C2 = (X, Y)| |(Y, X), with X = 10 and 
Y = 11.  The scenario on the right-hand side of Figure 2 is N2 = |(X, Y) (Y, X)|, also with X = 
10 and Y = 11.    
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 Table 1 presents the eight Spatially Neutral scenarios used in the experiment (N1 to 
N8) and the corresponding Closeness scenarios (C1 to C8).  Each row describes a pair of 
corresponding scenarios.  The first column shows whether these scenarios are of class PC, FI, 
OI or NI (and the corresponding game for the FI scenarios).  The ‘Match’ columns identify 
the scenario faced by ‘Other’ when the relevant scenario is faced by ‘You’.  This matching is 
a matter of logical necessity, because in any given scenario a player can work out what 
scenario (or, in the case of the Own Information condition, what scenarios) ‘Other’ is (might 
be) facing.  In most cases, the matched player faces the same scenario, but there are some 
exceptions.  For example, scenario C5 is part of a Battle of the Sexes game in which the best 
equilibrium for ‘You’ is the one in which each player claims the disc closer to her base.  The 
matched player necessarily faces scenario C4, in which the best equilibrium for ‘You’ is the 
one in which each player claims the disc further from her base. The last column describes 
how the closeness cue relates to payoffs. 
 
2. A simple model of multiple modes of reasoning    
In order to derive hypotheses for the games in our experiment, we develop a model which 
organizes the main findings of previous experiments on Pure Coordination, Battle of the 
Sexes and Hi-Lo games.  We begin by modelling players’ choices of pure strategies in (full 
information) 22 diagonal coordination games in which player labels are symmetric (e.g. 
‘You’ and ‘Other’, as in Figure 1 and Figure 2).  In a 22 diagonal coordination game, each 
player i = 1, 2 has strategies j = 1, 2, where each strategy j has a distinct payoff-irrelevant 
label lj known to both players.  If both players choose the same strategy j, the payoffs to 
players 1 and 2 are π1j and π2j, with π1j, 2j > 0; otherwise (i.e., off the main diagonal of the 
payoff matrix), both players’ payoffs are zero.  Payoffs are common knowledge.  Any such 
game has two pure-strategy Nash equilibria, in each of which the players’ strategies have the 
same label, and a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which both players’ expected payoffs are 
lower than in either pure-strategy equilibrium.  
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We model each player as being capable of using two alternative modes of reasoning: 
focal-point reasoning, as theorised by Schelling (1960) and developed by Bacharach (2006), 
and level-k reasoning, as modelled by Crawford et al. (2008).  In each game, the modes of 
reasoning used by the players are determined by two independent realisations (one for each 
player) of a random mechanism, using probabilities that are the same for both players but 
might vary according to the specification of the game.  This modelling strategy is justified by 
our objective to match the evidence, summarised earlier, that even in the same experiment 
behaviour in some games is more in line with one form or reasoning, while behaviour in 
other games is more compatible with the other (e.g. Faillo et al., 2017).  A model that treated 
each mode of reasoning as an unconditional property of a distinct player ‘type’ would not be 
able to explain this evidence. 
We assume that each mode of reasoning is self-contained – that is, a player who uses 
it acts as if believing that the other player uses it too.  This assumption appears the most 
psychologically plausible, given the bounded rationality of ordinary human players: 
reasoning about the game in multiple ways is much more cognitively demanding than using a 
single mode of reasoning.11  In addition, the evidence that salient labelling cues can be 
ineffective in Battle of the Sexes games would be difficult to explain if players who used one 
mode of reasoning were allowed to believe that their co-players might be using the other.  
The difficulty here is that, under reasonable assumptions, players who mix modes of 
reasoning in this way can be predicted to choose the saliently-labelled strategy in a Battle of 
the Sexes game. 
The most natural way to represent the idea that level-k reasoners believe that their co-
players might be using focal-point reasoning is to assume that a significant proportion of 
level-0 players (i.e., those who are using focal-point reasoning) choose the strategy with the 
more salient label.  But in Battle of the Sexes games with small payoff differences, all higher-
level players would then choose the saliently labelled strategy and so coordinate successfully.  
The mirror-image idea, that focal-point reasoners believe that their co-players might be using 
level-k reasoning, can be modelled using the concept of circumspect team reasoning 
(Bacharach, 1999).  Roughly, the idea is that sophisticated players look for a strategy 
                                                          
11 Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2008) found that subjects play games as if attributing less rationality to their 
opponents than to themselves, but when stating their beliefs about their opponents’ strategy choices, ‘they put 
themselves in the shoes of their opponent’ (p. 757), and reason about their opponents’ decisions as if they were 
theirs. 
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combination that is optimal for the players taken together, treating the behaviour of naïve 
players (in this case, level-k reasoners) as a constraint.  But (as we will show) the overall 
effect of level-k reasoning in Battle of the Sexes games is to produce discoordination.  Taking 
this behaviour as given, circumspect team reasoners would choose the saliently labelled 
strategy so as to coordinate with one another. 
Players who use focal-point reasoning try to discriminate between pure-strategy Nash 
equilibria by using only information that is common knowledge.  When describing focal-
point reasoning, Schelling (1960, pp. 83, 96, 106, 163, 298) often uses the metaphor of a 
‘meeting of minds’ between the players.  The suggestion is that, in choosing their strategies, 
the players imagine themselves reasoning together about how to coordinate their behaviour.12  
A natural implication of this idea is that, in their reasoning, players use only information that 
is common knowledge between them.  Items of such knowledge that can be used in this way 
will be called cues.  Players will concentrate on cues that are salient – i.e., that can easily be 
recognised by both players – and discriminating – i.e., that can identify one of the Nash 
equilibria as the solution of the game.  Given that player labels are symmetric, there are only 
two plausible types of cue that can pick out a specific pure-strategy equilibrium.  There is a 
cue of label salience if one equilibrium stands out relative to the other by having a more 
salient label attached to the corresponding strategy.  There is a cue of joint-payoff salience if 
one equilibrium stands out by having a pair of payoffs that is better for the players 
collectively, according to some salient criterion of ‘betterness’ that treats the players 
symmetrically.  For our purposes, we can restrict the criterion to payoff dominance. 
Our model of level-k reasoning is taken from Crawford et al. (2008).  Each player 
reasons at one the levels 0, 1, 2, ….  Each player’s reasoning level is an independent draw 
from an exogenously given distribution, in which level 0 has zero probability.  A player at 
any level L  1 believes that her co-player is at level L–1, and uses iterated best-response 
reasoning to form a belief about what that co-player will choose.  This reasoning is anchored 
on beliefs about the behaviour of level-0 players.13  A level-0 player is believed to have a 
                                                          
12 This aspect of Schelling’s theory of focal points is examined by Sugden and Zamarrón (2006).  The concept 
of players reasoning together has been developed theoretically in the theories of team reasoning (e.g. Sugden, 
1993; Bacharach, 2006) and virtual bargaining (Misyak and Chater, 2014). 
13 An alternative best-response model based on limited levels of reasoning is Camerer et al.’s (2004) cognitive 
hierarchy model, in which players at higher levels best respond to some distribution of lower levels.  Keeping 
the assumptions about the level-0 player unchanged, using a cognitive hierarchy specification would not alter 
the qualitative predictions summarised in our hypotheses: see footnote 17. 
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probability distribution over strategies which shows a payoff bias (i.e., it assigns higher 
probability to strategies whose equilibria have higher own payoff).  Payoff bias is 
independent of the size of the payoff difference.  Labels are irrelevant for level-0 behaviour 
except when all equilibria have the same own payoff, in which case strategies with more 
salient labels are chosen with higher probability. 
 Following Bacharach’s (2006) theory of team reasoning, we assume that the 
probability that a player uses focal-point reasoning depends on the likelihood that they 
identify with the group made of themselves and their co-player.  In Bacharach’s theory, group 
identification is facilitated by a variety of factors, including being members of the same pre-
existing social group or ad-hoc category (Tajfel, 1970), being exposed to the pronouns ‘we’, 
‘our’ or similar (Perdue et al., 1990), having common interest or common fate (Rabbie and 
Horwitz, 1969), sharing experiences (Prentice and Miller, 1992), making face-to-face contact 
(Dawes et al., 1988), or being interdependent (Sherif et al., 1961).  For our purposes, we 
assume that the probability that players use focal-point reasoning depends only on the 
players’ common knowledge about the presence or absence (and if present, the degree) of 
conflict of interest.  There is conflict of interest if the players have opposing preferences 
between the two pure-strategy Nash equilibria. 
 We now apply this model to the games in our experiment, after iterated elimination of 
dominated strategies.  Initially, we consider Pure Coordination games and Full Information 
games (i.e., Hi-Lo and Battle of the Sexes).  These are 22 diagonal coordination games with 
lj = Close, Far in the Closeness version or lj = Left, Right in the Spatially Neutral version, and 
πij  {X, Y} (with 0 < X ≤ Y).  We assume that the [Close, Close] equilibrium is label-salient 
in all Closeness games, that neither equilibrium is label-salient in Spatially Neutral games, 
and that the [Y, Y] equilibrium has joint-payoff salience in Hi-Lo games.  Notice that, by 
virtue of the symmetry properties of Pure Coordination and Battle of the Sexes, neither 
equilibrium in those games can have joint-payoff salience. 
 There is conflict of interest in Battle of the Sexes but not in Pure Coordination or Hi-
Lo.  In Battle of the Sexes, the degree of conflict of interest depends on the values of X and Y.  
The probability that a player uses focal-point reasoning is given by a function φ(X, Y), with 0 
< φ(X, Y) < 1.14  We assume that there is some probability φ0 such that φ(X, Y) = φ0 if there is 
                                                          
14 Given our objective to produce a model that matches the evidence available before our experiment, and given 
that, as noted earlier, neither focal-point reasoning nor level-k reasoning can in isolation explain all the findings, 
we need that both types of reasoning occur with positive probability. 
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no conflict of interest and φ(X, Y) < φ0 otherwise.  We also assume that φ is weakly 
increasing in X and weakly decreasing in Y (i.e., focal-point reasoning is weakly less likely, 
the greater the degree of conflict of interest).  By not assuming φ to be continuous, we allow 
the possibility that even small conflicts of interest may significantly inhibit focal-point 
reasoning, as existing evidence suggests (Crawford et al., 2008; Isoni et al., 2013; Faillo et 
al., 2017). 
 In the Closeness versions of Pure Coordination and Battle of the Sexes, a player who 
uses focal-point reasoning is assumed to choose Close with probability 1.  In the Closeness 
versions of Hi-Lo games, there are cues of both label salience and joint-payoff salience.  We 
assume that, conditional on having adopted focal-point reasoning in such a Hi-Lo game, each 
player has an independent probability (X, Y) of being guided by joint-payoff salience (and 
therefore choosing the strategy leading to the payoff-dominant equilibrium); otherwise, she is 
guided by label salience (and therefore chooses the label-salient strategy).  We assume that 0 
< (X, Y) < 1 for all X, Y, and that (X, Y) is weakly increasing in Y and weakly decreasing in 
X.  (Intuitively, the greater the value of Y relative to X, the more salient is the cue that points 
to the payoff-dominant equilibrium.)  In the Spatially Neutral versions of Hi-Lo games, a 
player who uses focal-point reasoning has only the joint-payoff salience cue available, and 
therefore chooses the strategy leading to the payoff-dominant equilibrium with probability 1.  
In the remaining Spatially Neutral games, which do not have joint-payoff salient cues, a 
player who uses focal-point reasoning chooses each strategy with probability 0.5. 
 Now consider the behaviour of a player who uses level-k reasoning.  Because level-0 
players tend to use label salience as a tie-breaker, and because this level occurs with zero 
probability, level-k reasoning implies that Close is chosen with probability 1 in the Closeness 
version of Pure Coordination, irrespective of the distribution of reasoning levels.  In the 
Spatially Neutral version of Pure Coordination, level-k reasoning does not discriminate 
between the two strategies, and so each is chosen with probability 0.5.  Because label salience 
is used only as a tie-breaker, the distinction between the Closeness and Spatially Neutral 
versions of Hi-Lo and Battle of the Sexes is irrelevant for level-k reasoning.  In Hi-Lo, level-k 
reasoning implies that the Y strategy (i.e., the strategy leading to the Nash equilibrium in 
which the player’s payoff is Y) is chosen with probability 1.  In Battle of the Sexes, the 
implications of level-k reasoning depend on the distribution of reasoning levels.  For our 
purposes, however, it is sufficient to treat this distribution as exogenous, and to define (X, Y) 
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as the probability with which, given this distribution, a randomly-selected level-k reasoner 
chooses her Y strategy.15 
 We now extend our model to Own Information and No Information games.  First, we 
consider Own Information games.  Recall that, after iterated elimination of weakly dominant 
strategies, these games have three pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria – two equilibria in 
which each player’s expected payoff is (X + Y)/2 and one in which it is Y/2.  Thus, no 
equilibrium stands out as having uniquely best joint payoffs.  We therefore treat these games 
as having no cues of joint-payoff salience.  The Closeness version of the game has a cue of 
label salience; the Spatially Neutral version does not.  We therefore assume that, for focal-
point reasoners, Close is chosen with probability 1 in the Closeness version of the game and 
Left is chosen with probability 0.5 in the Spatially Neutral version.16  Level-k reasoning has 
very different implications.  For a level-0 player, payoff bias will favour the choice of the 
disc that gives her Y.  But, since a level-1 player does not know which disc this is, his best 
response is to choose the disc that gives him Y; and similarly for higher levels of reasoning.  
Thus, in both versions of the game, level-k reasoners choose the Y strategy with probability 1. 
 Finally, we consider the No Information games.  After iterated elimination of 
dominated strategies, these games are equivalent to Pure Coordination games in which the 
expected payoff from coordination is (X + Y)/2 to both players in both pure-strategy 
equilibria.  Thus, as in Pure Coordination games, all players choose Close with probability 1 
in the Closeness version of the game and Left with probability 0.5 in the Spatially Neutral 
version. 
 Table 2 summarises the key properties of our model, and its predictions for the six 
types of games used in our experiment.  Each horizontal panel refers to the Closeness and 
Spatially Neutral versions of a given game type.  For each version, we first report the 
probability distribution over possible types of players resulting from the random draw which 
determines their mode of reasoning (recall that, ex ante, each player has a positive probability 
                                                          
15 It is possible for (X, Y) to be less than 0.5.  If the degree of conflict of interest is sufficiently small, level-1 
players respond to the payoff bias of level-0 players by choosing the X strategy; level-2 players respond by 
choosing the Y strategy, and so on.  Thus, whether (X, Y) is greater or less than 0.5 depends on the distribution 
of reasoning levels. 
16 In the Own Information games, the three pure-strategy equilibria give each player a payoff of (X + Y)/2, (X + 
Y)/2 and Y/2 respectively.  Sophisticated players might reason that choosing on the basis of equilibrium payoffs 
alone would make the expected payoff from choosing at random between the two identical equilibria (X + Y)/4, 
and therefore the equilibrium with a payoff of Y/2 would be superior.  Our model assumes a more naïve 
approach to unique joint-payoff salience, in line with empirical evidence (e.g. Faillo et al., 2017). 
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of adopting either mode of reasoning): focal-point reasoners who use the cue of label salience 
(type F), focal-point reasoners who use the cue of joint-payoff salience (type FP, only for Hi-
Lo games), and level-k reasoners (type K).  For each type, we show the probability that a 
player claims the close disc (in Closeness games) or the left disc (in Spatially Neutral games); 
where applicable, we report the probability that a player claims the disc worth Y to her.  So, 
for example, in Pure Coordination and No Information games the probabilities that a player 
uses focal-point reasoning or level-k reasoning are φ0 and (1 – φ0) respectively.  Both types 
chose the label-salient strategy with probability 1, so Pr(Close) equals 1 for both types.  In 
Hi-Lo games (with either congruent or incongruent cues), the probability that a focal-point 
reasoner chooses on the basis of label salience is φ0[1 – (X, Y)], the probability that a focal-
point reasoner uses joint-payoff salience is φ0[(X, Y)], and the probability of level-k 
reasoning is (1 – φ0).  In these games, all players choose the Y strategy with probability 1, 
except for the F types, who choose the X strategy with probability 1 in the Closeness version 
of Hi-Lo with incongruent cues.  In Battle of the Sexes games, the distribution of types 
depends on the conflict of interest induced by the values of X and Y, according to the function 
φ(X, Y). 
 We can use these choice probabilities to look at coordination success – i.e., the 
probability that two players, chosen at random, coordinate with each other.  We do this by 
considering the specific behaviour of each type in each game.  In Pure Coordination and No 
Information games, all players choose according to label salience, so the probability of 
coordination is necessarily 1.  In all other games, irrespective of the number of different 
player types, there are just two different types of behaviours.  In all cases, except Battle of the 
Sexes, players can either choose the label-salient strategy (‘Label’ in Table 2) or the strategy 
with a better own payoff (‘Payoff’).  (Notice that, although there are three types of players in 
Hi-Lo games, FP players behave like level-k players and choose the Y strategy.)  In Battle of 
the Sexes, a player can either choose the label-salient strategy or play as a level-k reasoner (in 
which case their actual choice depends on their level).  Two randomly-chosen players can 
either use the same behavioural rule or different ones.  Two independent draws of two players 
who use one of two rules (i.e., Label and Payoff) may result in one of three possible 
combinations (i.e., Label vs. Label, Payoff vs. Payoff, Label vs. Payoff).  The probability of 
each combination for each game is shown in each panel of Table 2, together with the 
corresponding probability of coordination Pr(Coord).  Note that if one player chooses at 
random, the probability of successful coordination is necessarily 0.5, irrespective of the 
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behaviour of her co-player.  In a Battle of the Sexes game between two randomly-selected 
level-k reasoners, the probability that they coordinate (i.e., that one gets a payoff of Y and the 
other gets X) is given by *(X, Y) = 2(X, Y)[1 – (X, Y)].  Notice that *(X, Y)  0.5: unless 
the X and Y strategies are chosen with exactly equal probability, level-k reasoning induces 
discoordination.17 
 
3.  Hypotheses   
We now use the information in Table 2 to derive our formal hypotheses about coordination 
success in our games.  In interpreting our hypotheses, one should bear in mind that, in the 
interests of simplicity, our model assumes away the mistakes players could make when 
implementing their strategies (or, equivalently, the existence of players who choose at 
random).  Thus, the specific values of coordination success generated by the model should 
not be treated as firm predictions about the behaviour of real players.  However, the 
qualitative nature of our predictions should not be affected by moderate degrees of noise in 
behaviour, which are inevitably present in experimental data.  For this reason, our hypotheses 
will focus on the direction of the difference between coordination success in different types 
of game. 
We begin with comparisons within the panels of Table 2, and look at the effects of 
salient labels keeping the type of game constant.  The Pure Coordination games (faced in 
scenarios C1 and N1) can be used to test the underlying assumption of our design that 
closeness is a much stronger cue than any cue contained in Spatially Neutral games.  In the 
Spatially Neutral version we expect coordination success to approximate that implied by 
random behaviour, and to be much higher in the Closeness version.  Since this directional 
effect is essentially a prerequisite for the rest of our analysis, we will call it Hypothesis 0: 
Hypothesis 0 (PC games) – With full information and X = Y, coordination success is 
higher in Closeness games than in Spatially Neutral games.  
                                                          
17 For all games except Battle of the Sexes, all the predicted probabilities shown in Table 2 would be unchanged 
if (as suggested in footnote 13) we used a cognitive hierarchy model in place of a level-k one, provided that 
level 0 is assumed to have zero probability.  In all these games, the predicted behaviour of level-k reasoners is 
the same at each level 1, 2, …, and so the best response to any one of these levels is the same as the best 
response to any probability mix of them.  To arrive at cognitive-hierarchy predictions for Battle of the Sexes, all 
we need to do is to re-interpret (X, Y) as the probability that a randomly-selected cognitive-hierarchy reasoner 
chooses her Y strategy.  The conclusion that *(X, Y)  0.5 is unaffected.  
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Our predictions concerning the effect of closeness in Full Information games are 
summarised in Hypothesis 1.  In Hi-Lo games with incongruent cues, our model makes the 
yet unexplored prediction that labelling cues reduce coordination success.  In Hi-Lo games 
with congruent cues, all our types choose the strategy leading to the payoff-dominant 
equilibrium irrespective of the presence of labelling cues.  In Battle of the Sexes games, the 
mix of modes of reasoning is sufficient to make coordination more likely in the Closeness 
version than in the Spatially Neutral version.  This replication of Isoni et al. (2013) is central 
to our investigation, as it motivates our interest in the Own and No Information games.   
Hypothesis 1 (FI games) – With full information and X < Y: 
a) (Hi-Lo games with incongruent cues): when players have the same preferences 
between equilibria and closeness is incongruent with payoffs, coordination 
success is lower in Closeness games than in Spatially Neutral games. 
b) (Hi-Lo games with congruent cues): when players have the same preferences 
between equilibria and closeness is congruent with payoffs, coordination success 
is equal in Closeness games and Spatially Neutral games. 
c) (Battle of the Sexes games): when players have conflicting preferences over 
equilibria, coordination success is higher in Closeness games than in Spatially 
Neutral games. 
 In Own Information games, according to our model, the presence of focal-point 
reasoners is sufficient to improve coordination success in the Closeness version relative to the 
Spatially Neutral benchmark.  Hence: 
Hypothesis 2 (OI games) – With Own Information and X < Y, coordination success 
is higher in Closeness games than in Spatially Neutral games. 
Our model treats No Information games exactly as if they were Pure Coordination 
games.  The fact that each player’s payoff from coordination in the No Information case is a 
binary lottery giving X and Y with equal probability has no influence on our analysis.  Thus:      
 Hypothesis 3 (NI games) – With No Information and X < Y, coordination success is 
higher in Closeness games than in Spatially Neutral games. 
 We now turn to comparisons between Closeness games.  In these comparisons, we 
focus on how coordination success varies between types of games with label salience but not 
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joint-payoff salience.  The first important comparison is between Pure Coordination and 
Battle of the Sexes.  Because of the way in which level-k reasoning deals with conflict of 
interest, our model predicts that coordination success will be lower in Battle of the Sexes than 
in Pure Coordination, in line with previous findings (e.g., Crawford et al., 2008; Isoni et al., 
2013).  This effect has two main causes: level-k reasoners have a tendency to discoordinate 
with each other (recall, *(X, Y) ≤ 0.5), and the likelihood that players use focal-point 
reasoning φ(X, Y) is weakly decreasing in the extent of the conflict of interest induced by the 
values of X and Y. 
Hypothesis 4 (Conflict of Interest):  With Closeness cues, coordination success is 
lower in Battle of the Sexes games than in Pure Coordination games. 
 The next interesting comparisons are between information conditions. Our model 
makes predictions about how Own and No Information games compare with Pure 
Coordination and Battle of the Sexes: in terms of coordination success, the Own Information 
game should be intermediate between the two, while the No Information game should be 
equivalent to Pure Coordination.  These are our final two hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 5 (Battle of the Sexes vs. OI games vs. PC games) – In Own 
Information games with closeness cues:  
a) coordination success is higher than in Battle of the Sexes games; 
b) coordination success is lower than in Pure Coordination games. 
Hypothesis 6 (NI games vs. PC games) – In No Information games with closeness 
cues, coordination success is the same as in Pure Coordination games. 
A final aspect of our model that is relevant to our design is the effect of changing the 
payoff pair {X, Y}.  This matters in Hi-Lo games via the function (X, Y), and in Battle of the 
Sexes games via φ(X, Y) and (X, Y).  These effects are best seen in relation to participants’ 
tendencies to claim the close or the more valuable disc.  In Hi-Lo games, increasing the 
difference between X and Y makes it more likely that focal-point reasoners use joint-payoff 
salience, and so claim the disc worth Y to them.  This only matters when label salience is 
incongruent with joint-payoff salience, reducing the probability that the close disc is claimed.  
In Battle of the Sexes, increasing the difference between X and Y has the effect of reducing 
the likelihood that players adopt focal-point reasoning, and hence claim the close disc.  
However, the effect on the behaviour of level-k reasoners can go in either direction, 
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depending on the distribution of levels.  So, the overall effect of changing the payoff pair in 
Battle of the Sexes games is not univocal. 
 
4.  Implementation 
We recruited 118 participants from the general student population of the University of East 
Anglia (UK) using the ORSEE online recruitment system (Greiner, 2015).  Participants who 
had already taken part in similar experiments were not allowed to sign up.  The experiment 
was programmed in zTree (Fischbacher, 2007).  Sessions took between 60 and 90 minutes to 
complete.  The average payment was £11.26, including a £5 participation fee. 
All participants faced the same thirty scenarios, in a sequence which was randomly 
determined for each individual.  They were told that, for the duration of the experiment, they 
had been matched with an anonymous ‘other person’ in the room whose identity would never 
be disclosed.  They knew that one of the thirty scenarios would be selected at the end of the 
experiment, and each player would be paid according to her decision and that of the matched 
person in the resulting game, plus the participation fee.  While the instructions were read 
aloud, participants were guided through a number of practices about how to make and cancel 
their claims (see below), were shown a variety of examples illustrating what each player 
knew in each of the information conditions, and were asked to answer a comprehension 
questionnaire to ensure their full understanding of the experimental procedures. The 
experiment started after all participants had responded correctly to every question and any 
outstanding queries had been answered by an experimenter.18 
In each of the thirty scenarios, participants went through a sequence of steps.  They 
were first shown the location of the discs on the bargaining table (with their base shown at 
the bottom, as in Figures 1 to 3), with both halves of the discs being empty, and told the 
values of X and Y (Step 1).  If X and Y were different, they were next shown the four possible 
configurations of disc values (Step 2).  One of these configurations would then be selected by 
the computer to be played, and presented in a separate screen with all halves of the two discs 
covered by question marks (Step 3).19  The information condition was then revealed (Step 4).  
                                                          
18 The full text of the instructions can be found in the Appendix. 
19 For the Full Information scenarios, the selection ensured that each participant faced all the scenarios implied 
by each disc value pair.  For the Own Information and No Information scenarios, the computer randomly 
assigned the values of X and Y to each disc for each player. 
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In the Full Information condition, all question marks were replaced by the corresponding disc 
values.  In the Own Information condition, each player’s own values were disclosed.  In the 
No Information condition, all question marks stayed on the discs.  Claims could then be made 
(Step 5).20  If X and Y were equal, participants moved directly from Step 1 to Step 4, and the 
corresponding Pure Coordination scenario was shown straight away.  Until the claims for the 
current scenario were submitted, participants could move back and forth between Step 1 and 
Step 5 as they wished. After the decisions were submitted, the whole process was repeated 
for the next scenario in the series.  There was no feedback between scenarios. 
In each scenario, participants could claim discs by clicking on them.  A claim on a 
disc was represented by a red line connecting it to the ‘You’ base, and by changing the disc 
colour from white to red.  Any claim could be cancelled by clicking again on the disc, which 
would turn the disc white again and disconnect it from the ‘You’ base.  Because there was no 
feedback during the experiment, each player could see only her own claims. 
After all participants completed the thirty scenarios, each pair of matched 
participants’ ‘real’ scenario, picked at random by the computer, was displayed on the screen 
together with both players’ claims and actual disc values. These claims determined the 
participants’ earnings.  
The thirty scenarios used in the experiment were constructed using three pairs of disc 
values: {10, 10}, {10, 11} and {6, 15}.  There were two Pure Coordination scenarios (C1 and 
N1) for the {10, 10} pair, and fourteen Full Information, Own Information or No Information 
scenarios (C2 to C8, and N2 to N8) for each of the {10, 11} and {6, 15} pairs.   
Because all scenarios have just two discs, we introduced variety in the set of games 
faced by each participant by using different layouts of each scenario.  These are detailed in 
Table 3, which reports the coordinates of each of the discs in each Closeness and Spatially 
Neutral scenario, as well as the layout seen by the ‘Other’ player (in the ‘Match’ column).  
Examples of these layouts are shown in Figure 3 above; the full set of game configurations is 
reported in the Appendix.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
In Closeness scenarios, the close disc was always in row –2 of the bargaining table 
(negative row numbers indicate rows on the ‘You’ side of the table), and the far disc was 
                                                          
20 Sample screenshots of these steps can be found in the Appendix. 
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always in row 2.  We varied whether the two discs were located in the same column to the 
left of the ‘You’ base (the LL layout), or in the same column to the right of that base (the RR 
layout), or one to the left and one to the right (the LR and RL layouts).  Notice that each LL 
scenario can be matched with a corresponding RR scenario, and vice versa.  LR scenarios are 
matches for each other, as are RL scenarios.  In Spatially Neutral scenarios, both discs are 
necessarily in row 0 (the middle row of the table).  We varied whether the two discs were 
located to the left of the ‘You’ base (the LL layout), to the right (the RR layout) or one to the 
left and one to the right (the LR layout).  The LL layout is matched with the RR layout, and 
vice versa.  The LR layout is a match for itself. 
 We counterbalanced the assignment of layouts to players so that each layout was 
faced by approximately the same number of participants.  Each player experienced all 
possible layouts.  Our expectation was that these variations in the positions of the discs would 
not have systematic effects on the relative strength of our spatial cues.  This expectation was 
confirmed (see Section 5). 
 5.  Results: summary statistics and coordination success metrics 
The claims that players made in each scenario are summarised in Table 4.  Since we found no 
systematic differences between responses to the different layouts of given scenarios, we pool 
across layouts when presenting our results.21  For each of the three disc value pairs, {10, 10}, 
{10, 11} and {6, 15}, the table contains a row for each pair of corresponding Closeness and 
Spatially Neutral scenarios.  The class of each pair of scenarios (and the corresponding game 
for Full Information scenarios) is reported in the ‘Class’ column, with the information 
condition also reflected by the question marks in the scenario notation.  For the Closeness 
scenarios, we report the frequencies of cases in which a participant claimed none of the discs, 
both discs, only the close disc or only the far disc, as well as the corresponding percentages 
(in parentheses).  For the Spatially Neutral scenarios, we report the equivalent information for 
none of the discs, both discs, only the leftmost disc and only the rightmost disc.22 
                                                          
21 We used Fisher’s exact test to check whether different layouts of the scenarios resulted in different 
propensities to claim the close disc (in Closeness scenarios) or the leftmost disc (in Spatially Neutral scenarios). 
We found significant effects (p < 0.05) in just two of thirty comparisons (see the Appendix for details).  
22 Because disc values were assigned at random in Own Information and No Information scenarios, roughly one 
quarter of the players faced two Own Information scenarios for each of the {10, 11} and {6, 15} payoff pairs in 
which the close (respectively, left) disc had the same value to them in both cases.  These scenarios had, 
however, different layouts, so that the relative position of the two discs was different in the two instances.  In 
Table 4, the frequencies (and percentages) for these cases contain two observations for these participants.  Our 
statistical analysis takes this aspect of the data into account. 
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[Insert Table 4 here] 
 It is immediately obvious from Table 4 that claims of none or both discs were very 
infrequent.  Overall, 1.4 per cent of responses claimed no disc and 3.1 per cent claimed 
both.23  Table 5 reports summary statistics, derivable from Table 4, about the distribution of 
one-disc claims in Closeness games.  In all Closeness games, each player saw one close disc 
and one far disc.  For each of these games, Table 5 shows the proportion of one-disc 
claimants who claimed the close disc.  Note that, if all participants ignored the spatial 
locations of the discs, this proportion would be 0.5 in all cases, except in Hi-Lo games, in 
which there is also a payoff cue which could skew claims in favour of the more valuable disc.  
In all FI games and in the OI game, each player saw one disc that she knew was worth Y to 
her and one disc that she knew was worth X, with X < Y.  For each of these games, Table 5 
also shows the proportion of one-disc claims in which the Y disc was claimed.  Note that, if 
all participants ignored information about disc values, this proportion would be 0.5, except in 
Hi-Lo games, in which there is also a spatial cue which could skew claims in favour of the 
close disc. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 The claims data in Table 4 allow us to check our convention of treating ‘leftmost’ 
(rather than ‘rightmost’) as the Spatially Neutral correlate of closeness (see Section 1).  This 
convention would be problematic if rightmost was more or less salient than leftmost.  We can 
test the relative salience of these two cues by looking at the distributions of one-disc claims in 
Spatially Neutral games.  For example, consider the scenario N1.  This represents a Pure 
Coordination game in which, for each player, one disc is leftmost and the other is rightmost.  
The null hypothesis that the two cues are equally salient implies that the two discs are 
claimed with equal probability.  An analogous null hypothesis can be formed for scenario N8.  
A slightly different test can be applied to the pairs of scenarios {N2, N3}, {N4, N5} and {N6, 
N7}.  For example, consider {N2, N3}.  N2 represents a Hi-Lo game in which, for each 
player, the disc that is worth Y to her is leftmost.  N3 differs only in that, for each player, the 
Y-valued disc is rightmost.  The null hypothesis that the two cues are equally salient implies 
that the Y-valued disc is chosen with the same probability in both positions.  The fifteen 
Spatially Neutral scenarios generate nine null hypotheses.  None of these hypotheses can be 
                                                          
23 Out of the 118 participants, 86 per cent never made such claims, 88 per cent made at most one, and 92 per 
cent at most two.  Thus, a minority of participants were responsible for the majority of the few dominated claims 
observed in the experiment. 
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rejected at the 10 per cent significance level (using binomial or chi-squared tests).  We 
conclude that it is safe to treat leftmost and rightmost as equally salient. 
In order to assess the effect of spatial cues on the outcomes of our tacit bargaining 
games and in testing our hypotheses, we will use two metrics, each of which applies to games 
rather than scenarios: mean expected coordination success (MECS) and mean expected 
payoff (MEP).  We now explain how these measures are defined and computed. 
 First note that, although each participant in our experiment was matched with just one 
of the other participants who took part in the same session, this matching was relevant only 
for determining final earnings.  Because no feedback was given until the end of the 
experiment, there was no interaction between matched participants.  Therefore, each player’s 
actual coordination success and resulting payoff in any particular game, as determined by her 
decisions and those of her matched co-player, are not very useful for evaluating whether 
closeness cues had systematic effects on the outcome of the game.  In order to assess these 
effects, we need measures that take into account the fact that each player was, in effect, 
playing against a population of potential co-players. 
 In computing MECS and MEP, we use a legitimate matching procedure analogous to 
the one used by Isoni et al. (2013).  According to this procedure, for each of the scenarios that 
some player faced, she is matched, in turn, with all the other experimental players who faced 
scenarios compatible with their being in the position of the ‘Other’ person in that scenario.  In 
our design, legitimate matches are entirely defined by the compatibility of scenarios (see 
‘Match’ columns in Table 1) and the compatibility of layouts (see ‘Match’ column in Table 
3).  Note that legitimate matching requires that the disc value pair and the information 
condition are the same for each player and all her matches.  So, for example, a player facing 
scenario C4 = (X, X)| |(Y, Y) in the LL layout is matched, in turn, with all players (except 
herself) facing scenario C5 = (Y, Y)| |(X, X) in the RR layout.  A player facing scenario N6 = 
|(X, ?) (Y, ?)| in the LR layout is matched, in turn, with all players (except herself) facing 
either scenario N6 = |(X, ?) (Y, ?)| in the LR layout or scenario N7 = |(Y, ?) (X, ?)| in the LR 
layout. 
 For any given game and for each participant, we can calculate the proportion of 
legitimate matches in which that participant would have successfully coordinated with the 
matched player.  Successful coordination occurs when the two matched players’ claims do 
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not overlap.24  MECS for that game is defined as the mean of this proportion, averaging over 
all participants.  It has the useful feature that its maximum value, achieved in case of perfect 
coordination, is one, just like the probability of coordination in our model.   
Similarly, we can calculate the average payoff each player would have got when 
playing the game, in turn, with each of her legitimate matches; MEP is the mean of these 
averages.  The key difference between MEP and MECS is that MEP reflects the values of the 
discs that players claimed to achieve coordination, while this is not the case for MECS.    
Table 6 reports MECS and MEP for each of the six types of game, separately for 
Closeness and Spatially Neutral versions of the games and for each relevant disc value pair.   
[Insert Table 6 here] 
In order to test Hypotheses 0 to 3, for each corresponding pair of matched Closeness 
and Spatially Neutral games, we use a bootstrap method to test whether MECS (respectively, 
MEP) differs between the two games.25  This method works as follows.  For each Spatially 
Neutral scenario, we repeatedly take random samples with replacement (with the sample size 
equal to the number of participants in the experiment, stratified over layout) from the actual 
observations for that game, and compute MECS (respectively, MEP) for each sample based 
on legitimate matching.  We then compare the actual MECS (respectively MEP) computed 
using the legitimate matching procedure in the corresponding Closeness game with the 
bootstrapped distribution for the Spatially Neutral game.  We conclude that MECS 
(respectively, MEP) is significantly different (in the predicted direction) between Closeness 
and Spatially Neutral games if the actual value of our statistic for the Closeness game falls 
above the 99th, 95th or 90th (or, in the case of Hypothesis 1a, below the 1st, 5th or 10th) 
percentile of the bootstrapped distribution for the Spatially Neutral game.26  We use an 
                                                          
24 Successful coordination may occur in a number of ways.  Players who claim no disc always successfully 
coordinate (but earn no money).  Players who claim one disc successfully coordinate with all players who claim 
no disc and with those who claim only the disc they did not claim.  Players who claim two discs successfully 
coordinate only with those who claim no disc.  As noted above, the vast majority of claims were on exactly one 
disc. 
25 We use a bootstrap method because the computation of coordination indexes such as our MECS require us to 
repeatedly match participants with each other, which makes the expected coordination success for each 
participant not independent from those of other participants.  A similar method is used in Bardsley et al. (2010). 
See the Appendix for details. 
26 A casual look at Table 6 may reveal that even small differences in MECS may turn out to be strongly 
significant.  This is because small differences in MECS may hide big differences in behaviour.  For example, 
when the close disc is claimed by fifty percent of the players (and the far disc by the other fifty percent), MECS 
is 0.5 (i.e., 0.52 + 0.52).  When the close-far split is sixty-forty, MECS increases to just 0.52 (i.e., 0.62 + 0.42).  
When it is eighty-twenty, MECS is 0.68 (i.e., 0.82 + 0.22). 
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analogous approach for comparisons between information conditions (Hypotheses 4 to 6), by 
deriving the bootstrapped distribution of MECS and MEP for the Pure Coordination and 
Battle of the Sexes games.27 
 
6.  Results: tests of main hypotheses 
In this section, we focus on the formal tests of the hypotheses formulated in Section 3.  For 
ease of exposition, and since MECS and MEP are very closely related, our discussion will 
concentrate on MECS, which maps onto our model more directly.  For each hypothesis, 
patterns analogous to those discussed in relation to MECS apply to MEP. 
6.1   Hypothesis 0: Pure Coordination games 
To test Hypothesis 0, we compare MECS in the Closeness and Spatially Neutral versions of 
the Pure Coordination game.  This game provides a benchmark for assessing the salience of 
the closeness cues built into our design.  In the Closeness version, MECS is 0.80, which is 
much higher than the 0.48 recorded in the Spatially Neutral version.  The difference is highly 
significant (p < 0.01; see Table 6), providing strong support to Hypothesis 0 and replicating 
Isoni et al.’s (2013) findings.   
 Behind this effect there are stark differences in the claims made by participants.  In 
the Closeness version of this game, the close disc was claimed by 86 per cent of players (and 
by 91 per cent of those who made one-disc claims), while in the Spatially Neutral version 
claims were spread virtually equally between the leftmost and rightmost disc, confirming the 
expectation, built into our model, that neither leftness nor rightness would be label-salient 
(see Tables 4 and 5). 
6.2   Hypothesis 1: Full Information games 
In order to test Hypothesis 1, we compare the Closeness and Spatially Neutral versions of the 
Full Information Hi-Lo and Battle of the Sexes games. 
According to Hypothesis 1a, in the Hi-Lo game with incongruent cues, coordination 
success should be lower in the Closeness version than in the Spatially Neutral version.  This 
expectation is confirmed in the {10, 11} payoff pair, for which MECS is 0.66 in the Spatially 
Neutral version and 0.56 in the Closeness version (p < 0.01).  But for the {5, 16} pair we do 
                                                          
27 The relevant percentiles of the bootstrapped distributions are reported in the Appendix. 
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not find a significant difference, although the observed difference is in the predicted 
direction: MECS is 0.77 in the Spatially Neutral version and 0.73 in the Closeness version.  
So, Hypothesis 1a is only partly supported.  A possible interpretation is that, in Hi-Lo games 
with large payoff differences between equilibria, joint-payoff salience is a much stronger cue 
than label salience.  
According to Hypothesis 1b, there should be no difference in coordination success 
between the Spatially Neutral and Closeness versions of the Hi-Lo game with congruent cues.  
This is what we find in the {5, 16} pair, where MECS is 0.78 with closeness cues and 0.80 
without.  But in the {10, 11} pair we find that adding those cues significantly increases 
MECS from 0.69 to 0.79.  Hypothesis 1b, like Hypothesis 1a, is only partly supported.  
Recall that Hypothesis 1b was derived under the simplifying assumption that players make no 
mistakes in implementing their strategies.  That assumption leads to a prediction of perfect 
coordination, irrespective of the presence or absence of labelling cues.  But if perfect 
coordination is not achieved, it is not surprising that congruent labelling cues can aid 
coordination, particularly when payoff differences between the Hi-Lo equilibria are small.     
In all the Hi-Lo games, the majority of subjects (ranging from 69 to 88 percent of all 
claimants, and 72 to 90 per cent of one-disc claimants in the Closeness versions; see Tables 4 
and 5) followed the payoff cue.  In the Closeness versions, the percentage of one-disc claims 
on the more valuable disc is smaller in the {10, 11} than in the {5, 16} payoff pair, 
consistently with our model. 
Hypothesis 1c is concerned with the effect of closeness cues in Battle of the Sexes 
games, in which there is conflict of interest between the two players.  As predicted, those 
cues have systematic effects on coordination success.  MECS increases from 0.47 in the 
Spatially Neutral game to 0.58 in the Closeness game in the {10, 11} pair, and from 0.47 to 
0.52 in the {5, 16} pair.  Both effects are statistically significant (p < 0.01), lending strong 
support to Hypothesis 1c. 
The disc claims in Battle of the Sexes games also reveal some interesting patterns.  73 
per cent of one-disc claims were on the close disc in the {10, 11} game, 65 per cent in the {5, 
16} game (see Table 5).  The relatively low coordination success in the {10, 11} Battle of the 
Sexes game does not reflect a bias in favour of the Y-valued disc in players’ claims.  In the 
{10, 11} game, only 42 per cent of one-disc claims were on that disc; the X-valued disc was 
frequently chosen in both locations (see Tables 4 and 5).  On the other hand, the majority of 
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one-disc claims (54 per cent) were on the more valuable disc when it was worth £16.  This 
effect – a tendency for players in Battle of the Sexes games to choose the strategy that leads 
to their less-preferred equilibrium when payoff differences are small – has also been found by 
Crawford et al. (2008), who show that it can be induced by level-k reasoning.28   Thus, 
behaviour in our Battle of the Sexes game is consistent with the assumption of our model that 
some players use focal-point reasoning and others use level-k reasoning. 
6.3   Hypothesis 2: Own Information games 
Hypothesis 2 is concerned with the Closeness and Spatially Neutral versions of Own 
Information games.  For both pairs of disc values, coordination success is higher in the 
Closeness game than in the corresponding Spatially Neutral game.  In the {10, 11} payoff 
pair, MECS is 0.52 with closeness cues and 0.48 without (p < 0.01).  In the {5, 16} pair, it is 
0.51 with closeness cues and 0.47 without (p < 0.05).   These findings support Hypothesis 2. 
 Although all these MECS values are close to the random-choice benchmark of 0.5, 
the small differences we report correspond with quantitatively (as well as statistically) 
significant biases in individual behaviour (see footnote 26).  In the Closeness version of the 
{10, 11} game, 67 per cent of one-disc claimants claimed the close disc, and 66 per cent 
claimed the Y-valued disc.  In the {5, 16} game, the corresponding proportions were 62 per 
cent and 82 per cent (see Table 5).  Notice that, consistently with our model, there are biases 
in favour of both the close disc (an implication of focal-point reasoning but not of level-k 
reasoning) and the Y-valued disc (an implication of level-k reasoning but not of focal-point 
reasoning).   
6.4  Hypothesis 3: No Information games 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that coordination success will be higher in the Closeness versions of 
No Information games than in the Spatially Neutral versions.  For both pairs of disc values, 
MECS clearly shows this pattern, increasing from 0.50 to 0.64 in the {10, 11} pair (p < 0.01), 
and from 0.46 to 0.62 in the {5, 16} pair (p < 0.01).  Hypothesis 3 is strongly supported. 
 The Closeness versions of the No Information game are interesting in that, although 
players are made aware of potential conflicts of interest, they have no payoff information – 
not even private information – that can discriminate between the two strategies between 
which they have to choose.  The only distinguishing properties are payoff-irrelevant cues.  
                                                          
28 This effect weakens during the course of our experiment (see Appendix). 
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Clearly, those cues were used.  Nevertheless, closeness cues were less powerful than when 
the Pure Coordination game was played with Full Information.  As noted earlier, in the 
Closeness version of that game, the proportion of one-disc claimants who claimed the close 
disc was 0.91.  The corresponding figure for the {10, 11} No Information game is 0.79; for 
the {5, 16} game 0.80.   
6.5   Hypothesis 4: the effect of conflict of interest 
In both Pure Coordination and Battle of the Sexes games, labels provide the only useful way 
to break the symmetry between the two pure-strategy Nash equilibria.  One of the 
observations that motivated our experiment is the finding that salient labels are used much 
less effectively in Battle of the Sexes games than in Pure Coordination games.  This finding 
is clearly replicated in our data.  MECS is 0.80 in the closeness version of the Pure 
Coordination game, but just 0.58 in the {10, 11} and 0.52 in the {5, 16} Battle of the Sexes 
game.  Comparing the observed values of MECS in Battle of the Sexes games with the 
corresponding bootstrapped distribution for the Pure Coordination games, we find that all the 
differences are strongly statistically significant (p < 0.01).29  This provides strong support for 
Hypothesis 4: conflicting preferences between coordination equilibria are detrimental to 
coordination success.  
6.6   Hypotheses 5 and 6: comparing information conditions   
The motivating idea behind our study is that the absence of common knowledge of payoffs –  
and therefore of whether or not there is conflict of interest – as in our Own Information and 
No Information games, would allow players to use focal-point reasoning more effectively 
than in Battle of the Sexes games.  This is encapsulated in Hypotheses 5 and 6. 
 According to Hypothesis 5, coordination success in Own Information games should 
be intermediate between that of Pure Coordination and Battle of the Sexes.  In the {10, 11} 
Own Information game, MECS is just 0.52.  In line with Hypothesis 5a, this value is clearly 
lower than the corresponding values in Pure Coordination games (0.80, p < 0.01).  The same 
holds for the {5, 16} game, in which MECS is 0.51 (p < 0.01).  However, contrary to 
Hypothesis 5b, MECS is not higher in Own Information than in Battle of the Sexes games.  
In fact, in both payoff pairs, MECS is actually lower than in Battle of the Sexes (and 
                                                          
29 Because the payoff pairs differ between Pure Coordination and the other games, our comparisons between 
game classes are only done for MECS. 
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significantly so in the {10, 11} pair, p < 0.05).  With respect to Own Information games, our 
model is failing to capture important aspects of behaviour.   
 The No Information games allow us to see if removing the last bit of exact payoff 
information restores the power of labelling cues to the level observed in Pure Coordination 
games, as predicted by Hypothesis 6.  This is not the case.  Although coordination success is 
relatively high in No Information games (MECS is 0.64 and 0.62 in the {10, 11} and {5, 16} 
payoff pairs), it falls short of the levels observed in the Pure Coordination game with the 
same cues.  In both cases, the difference is statistically significant (p < 0.01).  The effect 
reflects the greater proportion of one-disc claimants who claim the far disc in the No 
Information game (0.21 in the {10, 11} and 0.20 in the {5, 16} pair) than in the Pure 
Coordination game (0.09; see Table 5).  Hypothesis 6 is not supported.  We will consider 
possible explanations for the lack of support for Hypotheses 5 and 6 in the Conclusion. 
 
7.  Results: additional data analysis 
7.1   Learning 
Each participant in our experiment faced thirty scenarios, each of which represented a game 
between her and her matched participant.  The order of these games was randomised 
independently for each participant, and there was no feedback between games.  Under these 
conditions, each of our scenarios is strategically equivalent to a one-shot game between two 
players who make simultaneous moves.  However, it is possible that, even without feedback, 
participants evolved particular strategies as a result of repeatedly facing games of a similar 
kind (e.g. Weber, 2003; Rick and Weber, 2010).  For our purposes, this may be an issue if 
participants make different kinds of claims at different points of the experiment.  We have 
explored this possibility and found no significant tendency for close discs to be claimed more 
or less often in Closeness scenarios as the experiment progressed, or for left (right) discs to 
be claimed more or less often in Spatially Neutral scenarios.30 
 
7.2   Heterogeneity in behaviour 
                                                          
30 We have also looked at learning in individual scenarios, and found no systematic effects, except for the 
tendency, mentioned earlier, to claim the far, less valuable disc in the (Y, Y)| |(X, X) scenario less often later in 
the experiment.  The details of these tests are reported in the Appendix. 
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In Section 2, we presented our model as if all individuals were identical with respect to their 
inclination to adopt either kind of reasoning (as captured by the φ(X, Y) function), to use the 
payoff cue in Hi-Lo games when using focal-point reasoning (the (X, Y) function), or to 
claim the more valuable disc when using level-k reasoning (the (X, Y) function).  This was 
done for expositional simplicity.  In reality, individuals are likely to be heterogeneous in all 
these respects.  In this section, we look at the extent of individual-level heterogeneity in 
relation to the issues that our experiment was designed to address. 
 As we pointed out in Section 2, the evidence that existed prior to our experiment 
cannot be explained by attributing focal-point and level-k reasoning to two distinct player 
types: it is necessary to assume that players are capable of using both modes of reasoning, 
and that which mode is used at any time depends on the characteristics of the game being 
played.  But one might expect that, if these characteristics are held constant, there will be 
some differences in individuals’ propensities to use one mode rather than the other.  We 
explore the magnitude of this effect by looking at individual-level behaviour across Closeness 
scenarios which involve the same X and Y payoffs, with X < Y.  In each of the seven such 
scenarios for each payoff pair, there is a choice between a close and a far disc.  We 
investigate whether, over the seven scenarios taken together, there is heterogeneity in 
participants’ propensities to claim the close disc (an indicator of focal-point reasoning).   In 
six of these scenarios for each payoff pair, there is a choice between a higher-valued and a 
lower-valued disc.  We investigate whether, over these six scenarios taken together, there is 
heterogeneity in participants’ propensities to claim the more valuable disc (an indicator of 
level-k reasoning).     
 We adapt the approach used by Faillo et al. (2017) and look at the extent to which 
observed behaviour departs from a benchmark that assumes that everybody has the same 
propensity to claim the close or the more valuable disc, keeping the payoff pair constant.  
Focusing on the 103 participants who claimed strictly one disc in every Closeness scenario, 
we can work out what the distribution of number of close claims (respectively, claims of the 
more valuable disc, when there was one) made by each individual in all relevant Closeness 
scenarios would look like if everyone were identical.  For each relevant scenario, we use the 
observed proportion of close (more valuable) disc claims as the probability that any one 
individual claims the close (more valuable) disc in that scenario.  We simulate the whole 
experiment (i.e., 103 decisions for each relevant scenario) 200 times, and derive the mean and 
95% confidence intervals of such benchmark distributions.  We do this separately for each of 
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the two payoff pairs, and compare the cumulative benchmark distribution with the actual 
cumulative distribution of number of close (more valuable) claims made by the participants 
in the experiment.  These comparisons are reported in Figure 4. 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
Figure 4a reports the distributions of close claims.  Given that there was often a trade-
off between claiming the close and the more valuable disc, and that the more valuable disc 
was more attractive in the {5, 16} disc value pair than in the {10, 11} pair, it is not surprising 
that close claims were less common in the former pair than in the latter.  For both payoff 
pairs, the actual and benchmark cumulative distributions of close claims are very similar, but 
there are some signs of heterogeneity, especially for the {5, 16} pair.  We conduct a formal 
statistical test by looking at whether the variance of the actual distribution differs 
significantly from the variance of the benchmark distribution.  For the {10, 11} pair, the 
actual variance is 1.68, which exceeds the 95th percentile (1.60) of the variance of the 
benchmark distribution.  In the {5, 16} pair, the actual variance of 1.73 exceeds the 99th 
percentile (1.72) of the variance of the benchmark distribution.  Overall, not surprisingly, 
there is more variability in participants’ propensity to claim the close disc than there would 
be if everybody were identical, but the effect is quantitatively small. 
 A similar picture emerges from Figure 4b, which looks at high value claims.  
Unsurprisingly, the more valuable disc was claimed more often in the {5, 16} pair than in the 
{10, 11} pair.  For both pairs, the variance of the actual distribution exceeds the 99th 
percentile of the corresponding benchmark distribution.  As in the case of close claims, there 
is more variability than could be expected with identical individuals, but the differences is not 
dramatic.31  Signs of moderate heterogeneity are visible across information conditions.  The 
likelihood of claiming the close disc in one of the four Own Information scenarios or one of 
the two No Information scenarios increases in the number of close claims made in the Full 
Information scenarios.  Also, having made more high value claims in the Full Information 
condition is associated with a higher probability of claiming the high value disc in the Own 
Information condition.32  Similarly, claiming the close (respectively, high value) disc in a 
                                                          
31 Extreme ‘types’ were rare.  Only 4 participants claimed the close disc in all fifteen Closeness scenarios; just 3 
claimed the more valuable disc in all the twelve Closeness scenarios in which it was possible to do so. 
32 See the random effects probit regressions reported in the Appendix. 
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given {5, 16} scenario is associated with claiming the close (high value) disc in the 
corresponding {10, 11} scenario.33 
 An overall reading of this evidence is that there are individual-level differences in 
participants’ propensities to use each mode of reasoning – an aspect of behaviour that our 
model abstracts from.  But the evidence does not suggest that individuals can usefully be 
divided into discrete types, defined by modes of reasoning: most participants use focal-point 
reasoning in some games and best-response reasoning in others. 
  
8.  Conclusion 
Schelling (1960) suggested that rational players are capable of adjusting their mode of 
reasoning to the problem they are facing, and that game theory should take that into account 
to make more accurate and relevant predictions.  Schelling’s intuition about the use of focal-
point reasoning to resolve coordination problems has now been proven correct for situations 
in which players’ interests are perfectly aligned.  It has also become clear that players are less 
likely to use focal-point reasoning when there is common knowledge that coordination 
requires the resolution of conflicts of interest.  But questions remain as to how the transition 
between focal-point and best-response reasoning occurs.  We have addressed this question by 
focusing on the, arguably highly realistic, situations in which players do not have precise 
information about the payoffs of a game.   
 Our initial conjecture was that, in the absence of full information about the payoffs of 
a game, players would give relatively more attention to payoff-irrelevant features of the game 
and so be more likely to use focal-point reasoning.  In the model that we developed to 
represent this conjecture, we assumed that focal-point reasoning would be inhibited by 
conflicts of interest only if those conflicts were common knowledge.  Our findings do not 
support that conjecture. 
 In both our new conditions, the lack of perfect payoff information seems to make 
focal-point reasoning less likely than when all payoffs are known.  The effect is perhaps more 
dramatic in the Closeness versions of the Own Information games, where coordination 
success was less than in the corresponding Battle of the Sexes game, and where the majority 
of participants claimed the disc that was more valuable to them.  If both players follow this 
                                                          
33 See Tables A.4 and A.5 in the Appendix. 
36 
 
strategy, an equilibrium is reached, but that equilibrium (in which coordination is achieved 
with a probability of only 0.5) is payoff-dominated by the [Close, Close] equilibrium 
attainable by focal-point reasoning.  Choosing the more valuable disc in this game seems to 
be most naturally explained as the result of best-response reasoning, such as that described by 
level-k theory.  In the Closeness versions of the No Information games, there seems to be no 
reason for players to claim the far disc.  It is noteworthy that such claims (although always 
infrequent) were more common in the No Information game than in the Pure Coordination 
game.  This finding suggests that players’ reasoning may have been more subject to error in 
the No Information game. 
  In suggesting explanations for why our initial conjecture was not supported, we move 
into the domain of post hoc speculation.  In that spirit, we offer two possible and 
complementary explanations.  The first uses the idea, discussed in Section 2, that focal-point 
reasoning is associated with group identification, and that conflicts of interest inhibit group 
identification.  It may be that the mere awareness of potential conflicts of interest is sufficient 
to reduce players’ sense of being a collective ‘we’.  For example, in the No Information 
condition, players know that one of them might be advantaged relative to the other, even 
though they do not know who this would be.  The second explanation starts from the fact that 
more information has to be assimilated and processed by players of Own Information and No 
Information games than by players of Pure Coordination games.  For example, a No 
Information game is strategically equivalent to a Pure Coordination game, but recognising 
that equivalence is not a trivial task.  If players treat best-response reasoning as their default 
mode of thinking about games, more complicated games will be less likely to induce focal-
point reasoning.  For example, a player who feels uncertain about the situation she is facing 
in an Own Information game might fall back on the thought (represented by level-1 reasoning 
in level-k theory) that if her opponent were equally likely to choose either strategy, the best 
she could do would be to claim the higher-valued disc.    
 Common to both these explanations is the idea (fundamental to the analysis of team 
reasoning in Bacharach, 2006) that transitions between best-response and focal-point 
reasoning are not fully determined by factors that are represented in theories of rational 
choice: psychological factors play a crucial role.  Understanding these factors remains an 
important challenge for behavioural game theory. 
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Figure 1 – A Closeness game viewed by two matched players 
 
   
  
Figure 2 – A Spatially Neutral game viewed by two matched players 
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(a) The PC Closeness scenario C1 = (10, 10)| 
|(10, 10) in the LL layout 
(b) The FI Spatially Neutral scenario N3 = 
|(11, 10) (10, 11)| in the RR layout 
 
 
  
(c) The OI Spatially Neutral scenario N6 = 
|(5, ?) (16, ?)| in the LR layout 
(d) The NI Closeness scenario C8 = (?, ?)| 
|(?, ?) in the RL layout 
 
Figure 3 – Examples of experimental scenarios 
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Figure 4 – Cumulative distributions of close and high value disc claims by individual  
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Table 1 – Types of scenario used in the experiment 
Class 
(Game) 
Spatially Neutral scenarios   Closeness scenarios 
Configuration Match   Configuration Match Closeness cue 
       
PC N1 = |(X, X) (X, X)| N1  C1 = (X, X)| |(X, X) C1 Sole cue 
       
FI (HL-I) N2 = |(X, Y) (Y, X)| N2  C2 = (X, Y)| |(Y, X) C2 Incongruent with payoffs 
FI (HL-C) N3 = |(Y, X) (X, Y)| N3  C3 = (Y, X)| |(X, Y) C3 Congruent with payoffs 
FI (BS) N4 = |(X, X) (Y, Y)| N5  C4 = (X, X)| |(Y, Y) C5 Favours 'Other' 
FI (BS) N5 = |(Y, Y) (X, X)| N4  C5 = (Y, Y)| |(X, X) C4 Favours 'You' 
       
OI N6 = |(X, ?) (Y, ?)| N6, N7  C6 = (X, ?)| |(Y, ?) C6, C7 Bad for 'You' 
OI N7 = |(Y, ?) (X, ?)| N6, N7  C7 = (Y, ?)| |(X, ?) C6, C7 Good for 'You' 
       
NI N8 = |(?, ?) (?, ?)| N8   C8 = (?, ?)| |(?, ?) C8 Sole cue 
Notes:  PC = Pure Coordination; FI = Full Information; OI = Own Information; NI = No Information; HL-I = Hi-Lo with 
Incongruent cues; HL-C = Hi-Lo with Conguent cues; BS = Battle of the Sexes. 
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Table 2 – Model Predictions 
Game 
  Closeness game   Spatially Neutral game 
  Pr(Case) Pr(Close) Pr(Y) Pr(Coord)   Pr(Case) Pr(Left) Pr(Y) Pr(Coord) 
           
Pure 
Coordination 
F φ0 1 n/a –  φ0 0.5 n/a – 
K (1 – φ0) 1 n/a –  (1 – φ0) 0.5 n/a – 
          
Label vs. Label 1 – – 1   1 – – 0.5 
           
Hi-Lo 
Incongruent 
F α = φ0[1 – σ(X, Y)] 1 0 –  0 n/a n/a – 
FP β = φ0[σ(X, Y)] 0 1 –  φ0 0 1 – 
K γ = (1 – φ0) 0 1 –  (1 – φ0) 0 1 – 
          
Label vs. Label α2 – – 1  φ02 – – 1 
Payoff vs. Payoff (β + γ)2 – – 1  (1 – φ0)2 – – 1 
Label vs. Payoff 2α(β + γ) – – 0   2φ0(1 – φ0) – – 1 
           
Hi-Lo 
Congruent 
F α = φ0[1 – σ(X, Y)] 1 1 –  0 n/a n/a – 
FP β = φ0[σ(X, Y)] 1 1 –  φ0 1 1 – 
K γ = (1 – φ0) 1 1 –  (1 – φ0) 1 1 – 
          
Label vs. Label α2 – – 1  φ02 – – 1 
Payoff vs. Payoff (β + γ)2 – – 1  (1 – φ0)2 – – 1 
Label vs. Payoff 2α(β + γ) – – 1   2φ0(1 – φ0) – – 1 
Notes: F = focal-point reasoner using label salience; FP = focal-point reasoner using joint-payoff salience; K = level-k reasoner. φ0 = probability of focal-
point reasoning absent conflict of interest; φ(X, Y) = probability of focal-point reasoning when there is conflict of interest and payoff pair is {X, Y}; σ(X, Y) = 
probability that a focal-point reasoner uses joint-payoff salience in Hi-Lo games; ρ(X, Y) = probability that a level-k reasoner claims the disc worth Y in 
Battle of the Sexes; ρ*(X, Y) = 2ρ(X, Y)[1 – ρ(X, Y)]; n/a = not applicable. 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Game 
  Closeness game   Spatially Neutral game 
  Pr(Case) Pr(Close) Pr(Y) Pr(Coord)   Pr(Case) Pr(Left) Pr(Y) Pr(Coord) 
Battle of the 
Sexes 
F φ(X, Y) 1 0.5 –  φ(X, Y) 0.5 0.5 – 
K [1 – φ(X, Y)] 0.5 ρ(X, Y) –  [1 – φ(X, Y)] 0.5 ρ(X, Y) – 
          
Label vs. Label [φ(.)]2 – – 1  [φ(.)]2 – – 0.5 
Level-k vs. Level-k [1 – φ(.)]2 – – ρ*(X, Y)  [1 – φ(.)]2 – – ρ*(X, Y) 
Label vs. Level-k 2[φ(.)][1 – φ(.)] – – 0.5   2[φ(.)][1 – φ(.)] – – 0.5 
           
Own 
Information 
F φ0 1 0.5 –  φ0 0.5 0.5 – 
K (1 – φ0) 0.5 1 –  (1 – φ0) 0.5 1 – 
          
Label vs. Label φ02 – – 1  φ02 – – 0.5 
Payoff vs. Payoff (1 – φ0)2 – – 0.5  (1 – φ0)2 – – 0.5 
Label vs. Payoff 2φ0(1 – φ0) – – 0.5   2φ0(1 – φ0) – – 0.5 
           
No 
Information 
F φ0 1 n/a –  φ0 0.5 n/a – 
K (1 – φ0) 1 n/a –  (1 – φ0) 0.5 n/a – 
          
Label vs. Label 1 – – 1   1 – – 0.5 
Notes: F = focal-point reasoner using label salience; FP = focal-point reasoner using joint-payoff salience; K = level-k reasoner. φ0 = probability of focal-
point reasoning absent conflict of interest; φ(X, Y) = probability of focal-point reasoning when there is conflict of interest and payoff pair is {X, Y}; σ(X, Y) = 
probability that a focal-point reasoner uses joint-payoff salience in Hi-Lo games; ρ(X, Y) = probability that a level-k reasoner claims the disc worth Y in 
Battle of the Sexes; ρ*(X, Y) = 2ρ(X, Y)[1 – ρ(X, Y)] ; n/a = not applicable. 
 
47 
 
Table 3 – Disc coordinates in Closeness and Spatially Neutral layouts 
 
Closeness (C) layouts 
Close disc    Far disc    
Match 
Column Row   Column Row   
LL -2 -2  -2 2  RR 
RR 2 -2  2 2  LL 
LR -2 -2  2 2  LR 
RL 2 -2   -2 2   RL 
        
Spatially Neutral (N) 
layouts 
Leftmost disc   Rightmost disc   
Match 
Column Row   Column Row   
LL -3 0  -1 0  RR 
RR 1 0  3 0  LL 
LR -2 0   2 0   LR 
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Table 4 – Summary of claims by scenario 
Disc 
value 
pair 
Class 
(Game) 
Closeness scenarios   Spatially Neutral scenarios 
Configuration None (%) Both (%) Close (%) Far (%)   Configuration None (%) Both (%) Left (%) Right (%) 
             
{10, 10} PC (10, 10)| |(10, 10) 4 (3) 3 (3) 101 (86) 10 (8)   |(10, 10) (10, 10)| 1 (1) 3 (3) 56 (47) 58 (49) 
             
{10, 11} FI (HL-I) (10, 11)| |(11, 10) 1 (1) 3 (3) 32 (27) 82 (69)  |(10, 11) (11, 10)| 2 (2) 2 (2) 23 (19) 91 (77) 
 FI (HL-C) (11, 10)| |(10, 11) 1 (1) 3 (3) 103 (87) 11 (9)  |(11, 10) (10, 11)| 1 (1) 3 (3) 95 (81) 19 (16) 
 FI (BS) (10, 10)| |(11, 11) 2 (2) 4 (3) 91 (77) 21 (18)  |(10, 10) (11, 11)| 3 (3) 4 (3) 65 (55) 46 (39) 
 FI (BS) (11, 11)| |(10, 10) 2 (2) 2 (2) 73 (62) 41 (35)  |(11, 11) (10, 10)| 2 (2) 5 (4) 48 (41) 63 (53) 
             
 OI (10, ?)| |(11, ?) 0 (0) 4 (3) 57 (48) 55 (47)  |(10, ?) (11, ?)| 1 (1) 6 (5) 28 (24) 82 (69) 
 OI (11, ?)| |(10, ?) 1 (1) 3 (3) 95 (81) 21 (18)  |(11, ?) (10, ?)| 2 (2) 2 (2) 89 (75) 26 (22) 
             
  NI (?, ?)| |(?, ?) 3 (3) 4 (3) 88 (75) 23 (19)   |(?, ?) (?, ?)| 3 (3) 4 (3) 47 (40) 64 (54) 
             
{5, 16} FI (HL-I) (5, 16)| |(16, 5) 2 (2) 2 (2) 17 (14) 97 (82)  |(5, 16) (16, 5)| 2 (2) 2 (2) 13 (11) 101 (86) 
 FI (HL-C) (16, 5)| |(5, 16) 0 (0) 2 (2) 104 (88) 12 (10)  |(16, 5) (5, 16)| 1 (1) 3 (3) 104 (88) 10 (8) 
 FI (BS) (5, 5)| |(16, 16) 2 (2) 4 (3) 68 (58) 44 (37)  |(5, 5) (16, 16)| 2 (2) 4 (3) 52 (44) 60 (51) 
 FI (BS) (16, 16)| |(5, 5) 1 (1) 4 (3) 78 (66) 35 (30)  |(16, 16) (5, 5)| 1 (1) 5 (4) 57 (48) 55 (47) 
             
 OI (5, ?)| |(16, ?) 2 (2) 5 (4) 31 (26) 78 (66)  |(5, ?) (16, ?)| 0 (0) 5 (4) 14 (12) 99 (84) 
 OI (16, ?)| |(5, ?) 1 (1) 1 (1) 109 (92) 9 (8)  |(16, ?) (5, ?)| 3 (3) 6 (5) 90 (76) 19 (16) 
             
  NI (?, ?)| |(?, ?) 3 (3) 6 (5) 87 (74) 22 (19)   |(?, ?) (?, ?)| 1 (1) 5 (4) 47 (40) 65 (55) 
Notes:  PC = Pure Coordination; FI = Full Information; OI = Own Information; NI = No Information; HL-I = Hi-Lo with Incongruent cues; HL-C = Hi-Lo with Conguent cues; 
BS = Battle of the Sexes. 
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Table 5 – Summary of one-disc claims in Closeness games 
  {10, 10} 
  Close disc 
PC game 101/111 
(Scenario C1) (0.91) 
            
 {10, 11}  {5, 16} 
  Close disc Y disc   Close disc Y disc 
FI games      
Hi-Lo with incongruent cues 32/114 82/114  17/114 97/114 
(Scenario C2)  (0.28) (0.72)  (0.15) (0.85) 
      
Hi-Lo with congruent cues 103/114 103/114  104/116 104/116 
(Scenario C3)  (0.90) (0.90)  (0.90) (0.90) 
      
Battle of the Sexes 164/226 94/226  146/225 122/225 
(Scenarios C4 and C5) (0.73) (0.42)  (0.65) (0.54) 
            
OI game 152/228 150/228  140/227 187/227 
(Scenarios C6 and C7) (0.67) (0.66)  (0.62) (0.82) 
            
NI game 88/111 
n/a 
 87/109 
n/a 
(Scenario C8) (0.79)  (0.80) 
            
Notes:  The first entry in each cell is the number of cases in which only the close disc 
(respectively: the disc worth Y) was claimed; the second entry is the number of cases in 
which exactly one disc was claimed.  The first number as a proportion of the second is 
shown in parentheses.  The total number of relevant cases is 236 for the Battle of the 
Sexes and OI games and 118 for the other games.  PC = Pure Coordination; FI = Full 
Information; OI = Own Information; NI = No Information; n/a = not applicable.  
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Table 6 – Expected coordination success and expected payoffs in all games 
      {10, 10} 
      Closeness   Spatially Neutral 
PC game MECS  0.8***  0.48 
(Scenarios C1 and N1) MEP  7.71***  4.69 
                
   {10, 11}  {5, 16} 
      Closeness 
Spatially 
Neutral 
  Closeness 
Spatially 
Neutral 
FI games        
Hi-Lo with incongruent cues MECS  0.56*** 0.66  0.73ns 0.77 
(Scenarios C2 and N2) MEP  6.04*** 7.09  11.12ns 11.98 
        
Hi-Lo with congruent cues MECS  0.79** 0.69  0.78ns 0.80 
(Scenarios C3 and N3) MEP  8.56** 7.45  12.45ns 12.59 
        
Battle of the Sexes MECS  0.58*** 0.47  0.52*** 0.47 
(Scenarios C4–C5 and N4–N5) MEP  5.89*** 4.74  5.32*** 4.85 
                
OI game MECS  0.52*** 0.48  0.51** 0.47 
(Scenarios C6–C7 and N6–N7) MEP  5.51*** 5.02  6.96* 6.56 
                
NI game MECS  0.64*** 0.50  0.62*** 0.46 
(Scenarios C8 and N8) MEP  6.49*** 4.96  7.08*** 4.32 
        
Notes:  Asterisks show one-tail significance of MECS (respectively, MEP) in Closeness game relative to 
bootstrapped distribution of MECS (MEP) in corresponding Spatially Neutral game, as implied by our hypotheses: * 
= 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%; ns = not significant (or observed effect contrary to alternative hypothesis). There are not 
statistical tests for the ‘All’ panel. PC = Pure Coordination; FI = Full Information; OI = Own Information; NI = No 
Information. 
 
